4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

§2. SOVIET AGRICULTURAL POLICY

The late Alexander Guchkov used to say that 'the social revolution begun by Lenin in 1917 was carried through during the following twelve years in the towns and industrial centres only. It did not profoundly affect the countryside until 1929.' Just for this reason Stalin in that ominous year undertook what was to amount to a second and more fundamental revolution in the life of the peoples of Russia.

The condition of the peasantry had so far improved during the years 1922–29 that the Communist régime was able to realize that the peasant was fast becoming the principal and most formidable adversary of the Marxist Revolution. An implacable struggle was therefore initiated against that enemy who had succeeded in recuperating in the social and economic sense, but who was not yet ready to enter the field as an organized political force contending for mastery with a Communist Party which derived its power from the support of the industrial proletariat.

The economic Five Year Plans elaborated by the Soviet régime were dictated by the necessity of reconstructing the social and economic structure of the country in a way which should correspond with the bases of state which the continuance of the political dictatorship of the Communist Party required.

'The main idea of the Soviet Five Year Plans was the accelerated industrialization of U.S.S.R. and, parallel with it in accordance with the political needs of the régime, a rapid collectivization of agriculture. It was always for political rather than for economic reasons that the New Economic Policy, which the Communists had been obliged to put into practice since 1922, was abolished in 1929. The Communist Party, under the leadership of Stalin, proceeded to a new experiment in collectivism in the countryside, using in this case unusually brutal and inhuman methods which completely ruined all more or less prosperous farmers. The peasantry were unable to offer any effective resistance to the authorities, since their risings were only scattered and isolated in character. The peasants chose instinctively the easier way of passive resistance which found expression in the contraction of production and in the careless and unsatisfactory operation of the first collective farms (*Kolkhozy*). As a result of the policy of the Communist Party and of the natural reaction of the peasantry, the country had again to endure a frightful famine which bore its worst aspect in those regions where the percentage of collectivized farms was greatest' (Markov).

The Party had finally triumphed over the peasantry by the end of

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western Siberia, the Altai and the Far East. The execution of Stalin's commands is to be completed by September 1940. It is not to be anticipated that the acute conditions of 1929–34 will be repeated as a result of this new drive against the human nature of the Russian rural masses: the Communist machine has broken the strength of peasant society. At the same time, there is little doubt that the harvest of 1939–40 will not be as abundant as those of 1936–8.

The influence of the Revolution and of the Soviet régime on forestry in the South of Russia has been no less baleful than on other branches of rural industry. At the end of the nineteenth century woods covered 20 per cent of the whole area of the Ukraine; in 1928, according to the most optimistic estimates of Soviet statisticians, they did not occupy more than 7 per cent. Even in such a 'half-steppe' region as Poltava, owing to the care of the Imperial Government and of large landowners, woods had covered 10 per cent of the total area. 'Destruction of forests is one of the greatest evils because it is followed by the formation of deep ravines which drain the district of underground waters. The consequence of the formation of such ravines is that streams carry away valuable soil to the rivers and the sea. Every year thousands of hectares of good black earth are lost to the labourer and only serve to make the Dniepr and its affluents more shallow. The destruction of forests, the formation of ravines, the drying up of underground waters, threaten the future of the Ukraine with the gravest consequences.'

The Soviet Government is well aware of the dark side of its 'achievement' in the agricultural life of the South of Russia. But, as is well known, the Soviet leaders intend to effect a radical change in the balance of productive forces within the Union. Their reasons for this intention are both political and ideological: political because they realize that their dictatorship rests upon the industrial proletariat and has always aroused the antagonism of the peasants; ideological because they are the apostles of the mechanistic conception of life and, hypnotized by the material achievements of the capitalist world, they ape it in their attempt to transform it and can seek nothing more profound than the realization of Stalin's dream 'to catch up and surpass America'.

In 1913 the relation of agricultural to industrial production in Russia was 59·4 to 40·6. Under the original Five Year Plan formulated in 1928 the Soviets aimed at the attainment of a balance which should allocate 80·2 to industry and only 19·8 to agriculture. This fantastic aim was based obviously on the possibilities of bringing into exploitation the vast mineral resources which were known to lie under the soil of the Soviet Union. And all the political ruthless-

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ness and ideological fanaticism which are so characteristic of Communist psychology—itself a manifestation of a certain state of spiritual sterility—were brought to bear to achieve ultimate objects, which on the American continent during the preceding century had been attained by more balanced, hardly less heroic, and certainly less catastrophic methods.

§ 3. INDUSTRIAL HISTORY OF THE UKRAINE

The industrial development of the Ukraine has been based on the exploitation of the coal deposits of the Donets basin and of the iron-ore and manganese fields situated west of the Dniepr. Abundant layers of coal are found along both banks of the Donets. The eastern part of the carboniferous region lies within the territory of the Don with its Cossack population. The western part, which constitutes about two-thirds of the whole region, is situated within the boundaries of Soviet Ukraine.

Whether the Donets region properly belongs to the Ukraine is a question which has never been definitely settled. Historically, the lands along the right bank of the river Donets in its northern part belonged to that 'New Ukraine' which began to be populated in the second half of the seventeenth century by settlers from Muscovy and by fugitives from Hetman's Ukraine—at that time devastated by the Turkish invasions of Ahmed Köprülü and Kara Mustafa. Subsequently, these lands were incorporated in the Government of Kharkov. The lands along the southern course of the Donets formed part of the extreme eastern angle of New Russia where settled life only really began in the eighteenth century after the Tartar Nogay Horde, which roamed over this region, had retired beyond the Volga.

In 1917 the Provisional Government, in admitting five Ukrainian Governments as the legitimate area for the exercise of 'the national and cultural influence of the Kiev *Rada*', excluded the Government of Kharkov for the reason that the Donets coal area lay within it. The Ukrainian language is not commonly spoken in the coal-fields, and even if the large numbers of temporary labourers who come in from the north are ignored, not more than half the population of Donbass (the Donets coal area) can boast of their Ukrainian origin. In general, this region has nothing which unites its mixed industrial population to the essentially Ukrainian rural population of adjoining regions to the west. The only real link which connects the Donets coal-fields with the industrial districts along the Dniepr and the manganese and iron-ore regions is a purely economic one.

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different: 51 per cent and 49 per cent.' It is necessary to add that Sadovsky includes in production intended 'for general use' in both periods the output of agricultural industry: i.e. sugar, spirits, flour and sunflower oil. If these figures for rural industry are excluded, those for so-called 'light industry' remain practically negligible. For example, only 3 per cent of the textiles manufactured in U.S.S.R. are derived from the Ukraine; and there is no manufacture of cloth or leather goods.

As Sadovsky justly remarks, the policy of exclusively encouraging heavy industry has resulted in the neglect of the economic interests of the western and central Ukraine. In effect, with the policy of industrializing eastern and south-eastern Ukraine, the Soviets have shown a tendency to de-industrialize the wide and rich western provinces. Here the basis of their policy is probably strategic as well as political. 'In a series of towns of right-bank Ukraine such as Zhitomir, Berdichev, Zhmerinka, Mohilev-Podolsk, Uman, Smela, signs of decadence can be observed during the period of the Five Year Plans.'

The 'Economic Plans' of the Soviet Government are subordinated to a general political policy which, as has been explained in the preceding chapter, aims at the complete fusion of the Soviet Ukraine with the rest of U.S.S.R.; and according to Communist theory political unity can only be based on economic fusion. In forcing the pace of the development of heavy industry in the south and south-east to the detriment of the light and agricultural industries of the rest of the country, the Moscow Government pursues two objectives. First, the importance of the Ukrainian national element in the Ukraine is reduced. 'The Ukrainian people are an old people of agricultural civilization and have never shown any inclination for industrial work and life in big towns. The Ukrainian prefers the country if he can earn his living there, and if it is necessary he finds work in the different branches of rural industry' (Brégy and Obolensky). According to official Soviet statistics on the nationality of workers in the Ukraine, the coal industry employs 75 per cent Russians and 25 per cent Ukrainians; the metallurgical, 73 per cent and 22 per cent respectively; the building trades 56 per cent and 37 per cent (*The National Policy of the Russian Communist Party Expressed in Figures*, p. 177). About 50 per cent only of the people in the Donets region are Ukrainians, and among the urban population of the whole of Soviet Ukraine 70 per cent are not Ukrainians. In two big towns like Odessa and Kharkov only 25 per cent of the inhabitants are Ukrainians. The same phenomenon can be observed in centres like Mariupol and Lugansk. In this wise the

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185 433 development of industrial centres in the Ukraine and New Russia leads to a preponderance of 'new-comers'—in fact, of that social element on whose support the Soviets could rely in a political struggle with the forces of Ukrainian nationalism.

The second political objective which the Soviet Government has pursued is the strengthening of the economic dependence of the Ukraine on the rest of the Union. 'The Soviet Government systematically and intentionally binds Southern industry with strong bonds to the industries of other parts of the Union. This conclusion is imposed by a study of the categories of goods which are transported by the Soviet railways in a "meridial" direction. A considerable part of rail transport in Soviet Ukraine is engaged on the carriage of the half-finished products of industrial works by the most complicated and lengthy routes, e.g. from the banks of the Dniepr to the Urals or from the Moscow district to the Donets region and back. If a comparison is made of goods transported from south to north and from north to south, it will be seen that the machine works of the Ukraine do not "finish" their products, but that these are sent for the final processes to different and sometimes distant parts of the U.S.S.R. The motor industry, in particular, strongly binds the Central Russian region, South Russia, the Volga region and the Urals. Tractors and different agricultural machines can only be "finished" in Ukraine after being sent to receive certain parts from the north or north-east. The Soviet Government evidently is ready to make heavy sacrifices in finance and efficiency in order to attain its political ends which are to bind with strong economic ties all the different parts of the Union' (V. Levitsky).

433 Under such conditions, therefore, it is not possible to speak of 'Ukrainian economy' as an independent whole. Partly through natural causes and partly as a result of the political policy of the Soviet Government, the interdependence of the Ukraine and Great Russia has become even more definite than it was twenty years ago. The development of heavy industry, which has far exceeded the needs of the Ukrainian land itself, and the decline of agriculture has led to a strengthening of the 'meridial' tie (while at the same time Moscow, by somewhat similar measures, is strengthening the 'latitudinal' tie with the Urals, Siberia and Central Asia and is even extending it in this last direction into the outlying provinces of the former Chinese Empire).

The possibility of a wholly independent 'Greater Ukraine' (including present Soviet Ukraine with the additions of eastern Galicia (now incorporated in Soviet Ukraine), Bukovina and Carpathian Rus, may certainly be considered (as Ukrainians some-

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER FOUR

The New Economic Policy

With the cities prostrate, the land untilled and the people starving, not only in the Ukraine but elsewhere on Soviet-controlled territory, Lenin suddenly changed his policies and introduced various measures which rapidly relieved some of the most glaring defects of the Soviet system. The general term for the new arrangement is the New Economic Policy which more or less remained in force until 1929.

The basis of these measures was a change in the method of collecting taxes and income. Whereas, during the period of Militant Communism, the peasants had been compelled in theory to hand over their entire production to the state with the exception of what they were allowed to retain for their own personal use, they were now assigned a fixed amount which they were to contribute, and the balance they could retain or even sell in the local markets. The decree providing for this was signed March 21, 1921. This gave the peasants a new inspiration to work, for they could begin to make plans rationally and intelligently and could hope to receive some reward for their diligence and industry. This measure was supplemented by others which made it appear that the Bolshevik regime was in some degree returning to the philosophy or the practices of capitalism.

That was undoubtedly the impression that Lenin wanted to convey abroad. There had been signs that some of the European countries were willing to renew commercial relations with the Soviets, and the introduction of the New Economic Policy strengthened these desires. People began to speculate glibly and naively that the practical realities of existence had forced Lenin to admit much that he had previously denied and they predicted that in

000 the coming years the form of Soviet life would steadily approach that in the Western world.

●185 The same reaction was to be seen at home. Many of the more sincere and convinced Communists greatly disliked the concessions to the old order that were made at this time. It seemed to them that their revered master was turning his back upon his old position and they scoffed at the new Nepmen, who were growing wealthy under the new regime.

Lenin was not to be shaken in his policy. His motives in these concessions to capitalism are well expressed in the remarks in the *History of the All-Union Communist Party.* "Militant Communism had tried to take the fortress by frontal assault. It advanced too far and risked being cut off from its base. Lenin made the proposition to retire a few steps, to retreat for a while further to the rear, so as to pass from an assault to a siege, and then, after gaining strength, to return to the assault."

The later sequence of events showed the correctness of this explanation. The New Economic Policy in Lenin's mind was a temporary move which was made in the hope that the economic life of the country would revive. He made no lasting concessions and a careful reading of all the measures shows that they were not motivated by the sense of failure that was ascribed to them by the capitalistic world. Lenin did not put the measures in any form that would definitely bind himself or his successors. They did not provide any guarantees of their permanence, nor did they state any principle that was in contradiction with the basic philosophy of Communism. They were, obviously, a mere tactical manoeuvre in the difficult situation in which the Soviets found themselves.

185 The basic decree was signed in Moscow and was, of course,
665 only applicable to the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. It could not therefore be valid without further action in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic which was, by hypothesis, a completely independent and sovereign state. Yet so closely knit together was the fate of the Ukrainian Communist Party with that of Russia that it was not necessary for the Ukrainian Soviet regime to issue immediately any new decree on the subject. It was automatically

1/1 [New Economic Policy, March 1921 -- Analyst]

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

assumed that it was equally binding in Ukraine and without any further ado, the Ukrainian peasants were given the right of selling any surplus products exactly as if there had been no independent Ukrainian Soviet government. 185 665

The legal aspects of this decree did not interest the bulk of the Ukrainian peasants. They saw only the relief which it afforded them and the opportunities that it gave. They immediately took advantage of it, and its first effects were to be seen in a surprisingly short time. Of course, there could be no improvement in the national well-being until the harvest and the harvest of 1921 was again reduced by drought, so that with the best of intentions, it was not until 1922 that conditions began to improve.

A new Russian land code was finally adopted on March 3, 1921, and it was, of course, the model to be observed in the Ukraine. Yet this did not suppress the discontent of the Ukrainian peasants. 423 671

In an effort to suppress this smouldering discontent, D. Manuilsky, who was then the Commissar for Agriculture of the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee (the revolutionary centre and the provisional government of the country), summoned to Kharkiv a gathering of agronomists from all parts of Ukraine in the First All-Ukrainian Agronomical Congress. He found the more than one thousand present practically united in their assertions that the agricultural laws as developed by the Bolsheviks were inapplicable to the Ukraine. They had been drawn up and approved on March 6, 1919 and they were entirely based on the spirit of the Russian land commune which provided usually for a redistribution of the land every three years, with the supplemental provision that the redistribution should take into account the number of persons in each family. This was all very good when it agreed, as it did in Russia, with the general spirit of the people who were vitally interested in the commune as such. Conditions were different in Ukraine and the purely artificial Land Society was developed. Of course, all the peasants had to become members but the land was divided by households rather than on an individual basis. Furthermore, it was provided in the Ukrainian Code that "The right to land handed over for labor use is without term and

the very beginning, for at the moment the primary need was for food and the peasants were compelled to live upon what they could raise. It was not long before the returning prosperity commenced new differentiations in the villages. The poorer peasants began to take advantage of the provisions that they could lease their newly acquired land, and while the Russian law provided that a lease could run for only three years, the Ninth All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets soon lengthened this term to 13 years and liberalized the laws for hired labor.

The result was that by 1926, the poor peasants had leased 1,181,000 hectares and 53.9% of the peasants who had at least ten hectares rented additional land.

In a word, under the New Economic Policy conditions began, in fact, to return to what had been the situation prior to the revolution, with the exception that the great land owners had disappeared, but as they had been largely Russian or Polish, their departure only increased the Ukrainian influence in the villages and made them more homogeneous than they had been before.

The Commissariat of Agriculture endeavored during these years of reconstruction[1] to maintain as independent a position as possible. It established its own independent services, its own research stations which were concerned with Ukrainian agricultural problems, its own breeding stations and its own bureaus for study and development of the various branches of agriculture, and it did its best to separate these from the similar services directed by Moscow and not concerned with the particular problems of Ukraine.

The peasants responded to this with their own efforts. In 1922, with the famine still raging, they secured permission from Moscow to establish the so-called Selo-Pomich (or Village Aid) to provide credit for the peasants. This finally persuaded the Cheka to hand over part of the golden objects which they had stolen from the churches, and it used the capital thus secured to buy seed corn in America. It then loaned this to the peasants and when the harvest came, the loan was repaid in kind and more credit was then extended.

[1] [During NEP -- Analyst]

Ukraine Under the Soviets

185 474 241 The peasants also revived and breathed new life into the co-operatives which had been broken up during the period of Militant Communism. In 1923 they established another cooperative organization, the Selo-Tekhnyka (Village Machines) which purchased more expensive agricultural machinery and rented it out to the peasants for the appropriate agricultural work. These points became the centre of mechanization and were in effect the first [453] tractor stations. In 1924 they established the First Agricultural Bank, a sort of private institution which at one time had more loans outstanding than had the Ukrainian State Bank which was, of course, closely supervised by Moscow.

185 369 All these efforts[1] met with marked success and agriculture speedily began to revive. The peasants became more prosperous and their holdings of livestock rapidly increased, although they did not reach the pre-war level. This, in its turn, created a new demand for manufactured products and restored the factories to operation, and with them the conditions in the cities began to improve.

185 471 [475] Similar concessions were made to industry, but with one important difference. The larger and more important industrial plants were not turned back to their former owners who were, as before, allowed no voice or influence in their direction. They were taken from the workers who had seized and abused them during the period of Militant Communism and placed under the supervision of government trusts. These were either regional in character or confined to a single branch of industry. In either case, they were under the control of a more or less trusted group of men among whom Communists were in the leading positions, but while they received certain credits from the state, they were more or less autonomous and they were allowed to go through regular commercial transactions and encouraged to show profits in their annual reports. There was thus again a source of encouragement both for the directors and the workers, and slowly but surely the level of industry began to rise.

The smaller plants were very often leased to individuals who were allowed to employ hired labor and the hope was given to these that their taxes would be at such a level that they, too, could

[1] [NEP attempts to restore peasant prosperity -- Analyst]

show profits. The very small shops and plants were in some cases taken back by their former owners when they had survived and any provisions about the use of hired labor were tacitly forgotten in the first flush of the New Economic Policy.

All of these measures were interpreted by the great mass of the Ukrainian people as a recognition of the validity of human experience. There were, of course, keen realists who gave full credence to the declarations of Lenin that the Soviets had never wavered in their objections and were using these concessions only as a means of reviving the life of the country and strengthening their own position. At first this did not seem to be true and it was only as conditions really settled down and a semblance of prosperity returned that it became possible to note the steadily increasing pressure which the government exerted.

In the same way the currency reforms were not without their own influence. In 1923 the government introduced a new currency, the chervonets, which was ostensibly based on a gold standard, to take the place of the old depreciated paper. Nevertheless, the latter was allowed to circulate in the rural districts with the result that its value continued to fall and it became more and more difficult for the peasants to satisfy their needs for manufactured goods which were priced in the new currency. This produced the so-called "scissors," for with the restoration of industry, the value of manufactures continued to rise, while the prices of agricultural products continually fell.

The political system was still not clear.[1] The new regulations were introduced in the Council of Commissars in Moscow and it was emphatically stated that they were for the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, but Ukraine and also the other Soviet Republics put into practice the same resolutions, often without any decree by the ostensibly independent government.

The key to this enigma lay in the nature of Communist discipline. In theory and on paper the Soviet regime was thoroughly democratic in the broad sense of the word. There was an elaborate scheme of elections to the village and the higher Soviets, and even though this was weighted very heavily to provide increased repre-

[1] [During NEW ECONOMIC POLICY -- Analyst]

631 into three classes: Union, Joint and Republic. Thus, those of
642 Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces, Foreign Trade, Communications,
645 Water Transport, Posts and Telegraphs, Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Supply and Timber had full control over the corresponding sections in the federal republics. Those of Internal Trade, Labor, Finance and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection were nominally joint commissariats but, in case of a dispute between the Union and the Republic commissariats, the rights of the former were supreme. The remaining commissariats, Interior, Justice, Education, Health, Agriculture, and Social Welfare were still left under the Executive Committee of the Republic Supreme Soviet. It was thus very evident that, except in a few fields, the powers of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic to decide its own destiny were practically non-existent.

It goes quite without saying that it was these local commissariats which attracted the Communists of Ukrainian origin, whether or not they belonged to the Ukapisty or had joined the Ukrainian Section of the Russian Communist Party as former members of the Borotbisty. This was a very important development in the next decade in Ukrainian history and it was due to the relative freedom of the Commissariat of Education that the Ukrainian cultural renaissance took the form which it did.

655 At the same time, despite all the verbiage and the apparent
327 exceptions, it was abundantly clear from the very beginning that
185 the economic system of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was to be bound hand and foot to the Moscow regime and that its financial and industrial potentialities would be treated as Moscow wished.

It was relatively simple to deal with industry. The development of the coal and iron resources of Ukraine were simply transferred to Moscow control and it was practically impossible for the Ukrainians to express any opinion as to the form which that development would take. The Russian directors of the trusts could make such contracts as they desired and carry them out without regard to the wishes of the local population or the workmen.

432 Agriculture was a little more difficult. The decree of 1921,
241 which had started the New Economic Policy, provided for the
185

payment of a specific amount of tax in kind and left to the peasant the rest of his crop. In an endeavor to get this grain into Russia, the government offered to buy it but it did not have the funds or the inclination to pay for it at the market price. The financial reforms connected with the introduction of the chervonets could, to a certain degree, make it expedient for the peasant to sell to the government for cash, and as time went on the peasant gained the power of selling his crop for cash but the Moscow control of transportation and the prohibition of large scale trading left him helpless and he saw himself forced to dispose of it locally or to the government. Then the government made a fixed price which was far below that of the free market, and was often scarcely a third of the amount that the peasant could have secured. This sale of large quantities of agricultural products at a fixed price gradually became the rule and was one of the signs that the period of toleration for private income was coming to an end.

In 1925, the government began to clamp down on the small traders, the Nepmen, who had profited by the opportunities which they had had. Again it had a large choice of measures. Thus, depending on the situation, it could invoke laws against the hiring of labor; it could order the state agencies to refuse to buy from or sell to an obnoxious individual and thus isolate him; it could suspend his ration cards and perquisites, take away his right of voting and thus make him a pariah in the community; it could levy prohibitive taxes which would put him out of business and confiscate his property; or it could find some violation of some other law or regulation and imprison or exile him.

The degree of pressure which was put upon the peasants and the workers varied from year to year. Each year Ukraine was compelled to export more to Russia without regard to the needs of the local population. Thus, the amount of grain rose from 1,050,000 tons in 1924-5 to 3,165,000 tons in 1926-7, when there was a bumper crop, but in 1927-8, when the harvest partially failed and there were signs of need in the country, the amount collected and exported rose to 4,353,000 tons. At the same time, the continually increasing demands aroused again a spirit of oppo-

CHAPTER NINE

The Five Year Plan

Lenin and the Communists had never made any concealment of the fact that the New Economic Policy was only a passing concession to put an end to the stagnation and demoralization which had resulted from the civil war and the period of Militant Communism. It was not the adoption of a definite plan for the future nor was it a sign of a growing rapprochement with capitalism or a gesture toward the rest of the world, as the partisans of the Soviets abroad tried to make it appear. [185] 656 471 661

With each step of the recovery of the economy of Ukraine and of the Soviet Union as a whole, unobstrusive steps were taken to remove the various concessions which had been made. Year by year, from about 1925, new regulations were introduced by the Commissariat of Finance, one of the All-Union Commissariats which had the definite object of suppressing not only the concessions but of tightening up the restrictions on individual life and preparing the way for socialism and communism. By one device or another, the Nepmen were broken. Now the government forbade the state trusts to sell to them as individual traders either raw materials or finished or semi-finished products. Agreements which had been freely made by the government were either suddenly cancelled or were perverted. Obviously false charges were brought against the various individuals and they were fined exorbitantly or they were arrested and deported. By the fall of 1927 the sector of private trade had been almost completely liquidated and the way was open for the central government to do what it would with the situation.

With the Nepmen disposed of, the way was open for a similar attack upon the wealthier classes of the peasants and those who

These measures were so vigorously applied that it has been estimated 651
that by the end of 1932, some 2,400,000 persons had been removed 241
from Ukraine to parts unknown.. These were naturally the more 661
prosperous, the more progressive and energetic persons who had profited by the New Economic Policy and had accumulated some capital.

The forcing of the peasants into the collective farms, and the 185
prohibition of almost all possibilities for the securing of raw ma- 433
terials had a further effect. Under the older system, the Ukrainian 511
peasants had time, during the winter especially, to work at home and to supply themselves most of their need for manufactured articles. They were able to work in leather and in cloth and wood. This was now rendered impossible, for the individual plots were too small to furnish the necessary raw materials and the peasants were forced, if they would satisfy their most immediate needs, to rely upon the goods turned out by the state factories. These goods were always inferior in quality and short in quantity, for the whole point of the Five Year Plan was to develop heavy industry as rapidly as possible and the government took no interest in seeing that the villages were supplied with consumers' goods. It concentrated its attention on those branches which could be of use in military preparations. Even when petitions were made by the Soviets in Odesa and Kharkiv for permission to establish textile factories, they were peremptorily told that the plan provided for the establishment of such plants only in selected parts of the RSFSR. Thus to the local shortage was added the costs of distant transportation, which made the price prohibitive even for the goods that were received.

In 1931 almost the entire grain reserves were removed from 651
Ukraine and the peasants had nothing to carry over, and when in 685
1932 there came a drought in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, the 241
peasants had no supplies. 511

This did not bother the authorities. During 1931 and 1932 they collected from the peasants all that they could. The next step was to tighten the laws.

On August 6, 1932 the TsK VKP/b and the Soviet of Com-

[1929-1930 - 1st Five Year Plan -- Analyst]

Ukraine Under the Soviets

731 There is the frequent idea that the famine was specifically
661 directed against the rich peasants and the kurkuls. This is utterly
[565] false, for these had been liquidated earlier. The blow of 1933 fell chiefly upon the poorer classes who had always supported the Soviet regime and who regarded their suffering in the beginning as a mistake which Moscow would do its best to correct. In the same way it was the Ukrainian workmen of the smaller cities who bore the brunt of the hardships. It was the direct triumph of the Russian Bolsheviks over the Ukrainian poor.

185 Another proof that the famine occurred in connection with
731 the plans of Moscow was the fact that Postyshev, besides his official post, held that of general inspector of the Ministry of Grain Production for resettlement. It turned out later that he was given the general task of preparing a plan for an immigration into Ukraine from various portions of the Soviet Union. The dislocation of the population was worked out in detail. Millions of Russians, Byelorussians, Uzbeks, etc., were to be sent in to complete the work of rerussification. Especial pains were devoted to the regions close to Russia on the Left Bank of the Dnieper and there was talk at one time of annexing to the Russian Republic the Kharkiv-Donbas industrial region, but this did not fall in with the plans of Stalin.

[423] The result of the famine was the final stabilization of the collective system of agriculture and the breaking of the old mode of life throughout the whole of Ukraine. More than that, it established the fact that in the economic sphere Moscow could direct Ukrainian life as it would. It overawed the population for the moment but it did not reconcile them to their fate and it went hand in hand with the attempt to exterminate the old Ukrainian cultural life.

[Ukraine, 1933 -- Analysis]

731 the country might have escaped, had it not been for the methods of the government in draining off from the population the last possible reserves of food.

731 185 There can be no doubt that this was done deliberately, for every measure taken by the government was intended to increase the difficulties of the population and to prepare for the final crushing of the Ukrainian renaissance that had been proceeding with ever [648] increasing force. Every measure, too, was intended to render it more difficult for the outside world to secure any actual knowledge of the conditions in the country until it was too late for the world to do more than register vain protests, for it was very definitely at this period that the censorship methods of the government and its apprehensions of what knowledge might bring to the world actively commenced to draw an iron curtain around Ukraine. Foreign correspondents were forbidden to visit Ukraine on one pretext or another and they were forced to send out such news as the government wished or to leave the Soviet Union.

[661] The collectivization and the famine had coincided with the beginning of the attack on Ukrainian scholarship and the arts, as we shall see, but these attacks by their very choice of victims had been directed against those men who had not been closely connected with the Communist Party in the past, even though they had not been entirely hostile. Along with the famine the tide turned, and soon the victims were those persons who had dared to hope for an equality of treatment (with the Great Russians) in the Soviet Union.

The famine was obviously intended not only to crush the population already impoverished by the collectivization but to administer a sound chastisement to all classes who were interested in the preservation and development of local and republic interests.

731 The famine was at its height in the winter and spring of 1933 and was only somewhat alleviated after the harvest of that year was 648 brought in. It was only natural that, despite the efforts of the authorities, word of it would gradually seep out, in spite of the censorship. The news was most accessible to the Western Ukrainians, for as yet all communications had not been satisfactorily broken, and early in the summer they began to seek permission to organize relief

abroad for the benefit of the sufferers. On July 14, 1933, such a body was already formed in Lviv and soon in the other sections of Western Ukraine, while their appeals were heard by the Ukrainian emigrés abroad.

In August, Theodore Cardinal Innitzer of Vienna had been convinced of the truth of the famine and he appealed for aid for the starving. In the same month the General Secretary of the Congress of European Minorities published his summary of the conditions, as gleaned from all available sources, and the League took action at its meeting in September. In the same month the matter was brought up before the League of Nations in Geneva and relief was referred to the International Red Cross.

The movement spread to the Ukrainians in North America and on November 3, 1933, the sixth convention of the United Ukrainian Organizations of the United States appealed to the government of the United States, urging that an impartial commission be sent to Ukraine to report on the truth of these reports.

This growing wave of protests among the Ukrainians and the emigrants from Ukraine was met by a stony silence on the part of the Soviet authorities, by absolute denial or by charges of unfriendly propaganda. The Soviet government refused to lift its barrier on any visits to Ukraine by foreign journalists or by any foreign visitors until after the harvest of 1933 was brought in and then they induced such journalists as Walter Duranty to recant previous statements as to the extent of the famine and report on September 18, 1933, that the harvest of that year was excellent "and all talk of famine now is ridiculous."

Almost the first detailed account of an American journalist was given by William Henry Chamberlin on May 29, 1934, on his return from the Soviet Union, when he estimated that between four and five million peasants were starving and he also quoted the speech of President Kalinin of the Soviet Union, made the year before, "The collective farmers have passed through a good school. For some, this school was quite ruthless."

This was a polite hint again that it had been the policy of the government to allow the famine to run its course in the hope of

731 breaking any possible opposition on the part of the collective farms
185 and the individual peasants.

The famine then on the domestic scene marked a definite turning point, a definite shift of emphasis in the relations between the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Soviet Union, and that shift was extended to the individual Ukrainian. Yet, the very reports that emanated from the stricken country were not without their significance for the world.

731 1933 was a fateful year for Europe. The order to apply the
648 maximum pressure on the Ukrainians came on January 24th. On January 28th, just four days later and before the news could have leaked out, Kurt von Schleicher resigned as Chancellor of Germany and was succeeded by Adolf Hitler. Within a month came the Reichstag fire and all the turmoil connected with the advent of the Nazis to power.

A world that had still not been fully convinced of the dangers of the Communist regime was only too ready to magnify its benefits and its possibilities for good as compared with the apparently more pressing menace of Hitler. The period of the popular fronts began in all the European countries and it coincided with the coming into power of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the American bank crisis.

Under such circumstances, the rumors of the Ukrainian famine were heavily discounted by all except the most bitter anti-Communists and they obtained short hearing before world public opinion. No one wanted to believe these reports, and the troubled conditions when the reaction to the right seemed the menace to a world desirous of peace made it seem logical that the democratic world could secure some aid in its struggle from the Communist regime. All the old talk of the artificiality of the Ukrainian struggle that had circulated in 1918 was now reburnished and repropagandized.

The result might have been expected but it showed Stalin and the Soviet leaders that they had played their course well. They secured recognition by the United States in November of the same year, just as the real news of the extent of the tragedy was beginning

The crying need of the Ukrainians was for consumer goods. Odesa and Kharkiv requested that they might be given the power to build textile mills to supply the needs of the local population. The request was denied, for the authorities had decided that the textile industry was to be concentrated in the RSFSR. The iron and steel cities requested that they might be given the permission to build factories to complete the fabrication of certain delicate types of machinery. The request was refused because it was to be only in the Moscow area that such articles were to be made. It was to be the task of Ukraine to furnish the raw material, the iron ore from Kryvy Rih, the coal of the Donbas, and to prepare the semi-finished pig-iron and other forms of semi-fabricated material that were needed by the central plants.

The plan not only provided for construction. It went even further and specified the exact amount of products that were to be turned out by each individual plant. While it was possible to secure some profits from the over-fulfillment of the plan, regardless of the effect that this might have upon the plan as a whole, any under-fulfillment was treated as a gross failure of obligation to the state.

This led, in turn, to additional restrictions on the freedom of the workers. Punishments were ordered for tardiness, for absence from employment even for a single day without a satisfactory reason, for an attempt to change the place of employment. These regulations were not the product of the governing bodies of the republics but of the Union authorities themselves and they were transmitted from Moscow to the national republics through the liaison between the All-Union commissariats and their subordinate organs.

It was the same with agriculture. Moscow knew what each collective farm, each kolkhoz, each sovkhoz was to furnish, and woe to the group that failed. The famine had been the result and that had been used to break the spirit of resistance of the Ukrainian villagers. The government specified the acreage that was to be devoted to wheat, to barley, to all of the crops that could be raised and it did no good if the local agronomists pointed out new

433 methods, new possibilities. Their actions were interpreted as merely
●185 a defiance of the central government, a new case of wrecking or
656 of sabotage and were treated accordingly. In the first rush of collectivization, the network of agricultural centres that had been developed in Ukraine during the twenties as a responsible answer to the local appreciation of the problem was wiped out and most of their leaders paid the penalty for their temerity in standing by their own studies and their own achievements.

[432] There were only the slightest concessions finally made to the peasants. They were allowed to sell a certain amount of the surplus grain to the government at a somewhat higher price. The individual families were allowed to possess about an acre of land on which they could raise their own produce, provide their winter food as a result of their own labors and they were allowed to sell their own produce in what may best be described as a legalized black market, but this meant merely the privilege to sell themselves in some of the larger local centres, and to many of these they were allowed to go only if they secured the appropriate permits from the heads of the collective farms and the local representatives of the NKVD.

[511] Even these slight concessions, while they could not bring prosperity to the peasants on the collective farms, rendered it possible for them to keep body and soul together despite the steadily dropping standard of living and the almost complete lack of consumer goods which were furnished in quantity only to the inhabitants of the more favored regions, as Moscow and Leningrad. At the same time, the peasants felt, ever more bitterly, the fact that the new conditions of living prevented almost all those home manufactures which in the earlier period had enabled them to compensate in some degree for the lack of proper articles of industry.

166 There was thus a growing material impoverishment of the
626 village communities and a loss of the old spontaneity and gaiety that had marked Ukraine even under the hardest conditions of the past. Attempts were made to utilize this for forcing peasants to leave the villages and join the industrial masses in the cities and work in the new plants. Others were encouraged to leave the

½ [after 1933 famine + Russification -- Analyst]

661 population. Husbands and wives, parents and children, brothers
681 and sisters hardly dared to speak to one another, to say anything lest their closest friends and relatives had been compelled to join the NKVD or had turned informers for their own selfish purposes. For one arrest of a guilty bourgeois nationalist, a hundred people who had done nothing amiss and had scarcely dared to think, were deported.

661 The Ukrainians were taken out of Ukraine in large masses
631 and the concentration and labor camps in the far north and in
166 eastern Asia were filled to overflowing as the Soviet authorities continued their policy of developing their industrial centres east of the Urals. The places in the cities and the collective farms thus emptied were, in turn, filled by the importation of Russians and citizens of the other Soviet republics as a means of producing not Ukrainian or Azerbaijanian Soviet loyalty but as a means of establishing a new universal Soviet patriotism and of separating the nationalities from their republics which were henceforth to be mere administrative and economic subdivisions of the Soviet state.

[185] The object of these purges and these changes was the breaking
[156] up of the population into individual entities who would recognize no bonds of attachment to anything except the state. It was in a sense the culmination of the efforts to break the sense of national or even racial or clan unity which had been so strong in 1917, when the Ukrainian National Republic had been established. The Communists had broken this by playing upon class feelings; they had broken down the class into families and now, under the relentless pressure of Yezhov, they tried to go further and to break the families into individuals.

626 In line with this policy there came a complete ending to the
186 interest in the Ukrainians in the RSFSR and the other Soviet Republics. Skrypnyk had done his best to educate the several million of these in Ukrainian and at the moment of his fall the UkSSR was sending papers, books, and theatrical companies, as well as teachers, to educate and maintain their Ukrainian feelings as loyal members of the Soviet Union. That was abruptly changed in 1932 and the pressure upon them to declare themselves as

[During 1936-'38 -- Analyst]

728 were a few well-known persons on the various lists of delegates, 666 the vast majority were either completely unknown or were definitely recognized as representatives of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic or of the occupying forces.

The election on October 22 was carried on in the regular Bolshevik fashion with no opportunity for any choice of candidates. Over 90% of the people were marshalled to the polls and it was made clear that they had no choice but to approve the selected list. The response was, of course, practically unanimous and the next step was then in order.

728 On October 26 the National Assembly met in Lviv. The delegates, acting under definite orders, elected a presidium which included Stalin and the officials of the UkSSR. The first act was to pass a resolution of gratitude to Stalin and the Soviet leaders for their liberation of the country. Then there were a few laudatory speeches and the resolution was adopted to apply for membership in the USSR, to nationalize trade, industry and the banks, to divide the land of the state, the large landowners and the church among the landless and poor peasants, and to send a delegation to Kiev and Moscow to ask for the incorporation.

All this was a cut and dried performance to satisfy the Communist love of paper democracy and to justify their occupation of the country under the guise of liberation. There was no discussion allowed and once again the resolution was accepted unanimously.

On November 1 the selected delegation met Stalin, and the Presidium of the USSR in Moscow formally welcomed the liberated brothers and annexed their territory to the UkSSR. It was noteworthy that the action of Moscow completely overshadowed any reception at Kiev but this was only natural in view of the nature of the entire enterprise. There were none of those demonstrations that had marked the union of the two sections in the Ukrainian National Republic in 1919, when the vote and the union represented the will of the people.

Once these formalities had been accomplished, the Soviets felt free to act and, at a steadily increasing tempo, they went through in a few months a refined version of what they had accomplished

[185]

1 [1939 -- Analyst]

thousand karbovantsy in money. When we remember that, as a result of the Soviet tax system, a pair of shoes cost five hundred karbovantsy and a suit of average quality a little more than one thousand karbovantsy, we can see how dependent the average peasant is upon his small plot on which his egg tax is, whether he raises eggs or not, two hundred per year. In addition, from his cash resources he must buy the grain for his hens or raise it on his own plot.

It is small wonder that the foreign visitor is not welcomed on these collective farms except in a few places which are kept for show. In all of them the Communist heads receive very satisfactory living conditions with opportunities to purchase supplies at very moderate prices in shops devised for Communist administrators, and it is these administrators, and the Communists of the Motor Tractor Stations and the MVD who receive almost the entire income that is allotted to the collective farm.

The position of the city laborer is little better, although he receives in connection with his plant the opportunity of securing whatever the factory heads feel like giving him for food in the factory dining rooms.

In 1946-7, before Western Ukraine was fully Communized, there was another drought in the black earth region and once again starvation hung as a spectre over the entire population. Those who had the strength and courage to get to Western Ukraine in search of food were surprised how much food there was still to be found in those areas where the peasants were still allowed to use their own energy, skill and knowledge even on their own small farms which still looked like paradise to those poor devils who had passed through the period of the thirties.

Still later, collectivization was introduced into Western Ukraine and the other accompaniments of the regime in the east were at once apparent.

The Fifth Five Year Plan which was adopted in 1950 continued and intensified the process. From the figures which has been revealed, it is obvious that the increases which have been demanded of the Ukraine in this period are relatively minor. There

[Post-WORLD WAR II -1945 -- Analyst]

185 are a few large projects planned in the eastern part of the country which can be made immediately accessible to the Moscow Industrial area but which will be of little value to the Ukrainian population, for even the resorts along the coast of the Black Sea have now been definitely placed under a Union Commissariat and are being improved to accommodate the higher officials from the centre. The whole strength of the Soviet Union is being exerted to build up the industrial centres in the Urals and further to the east.

During these years there has been little progress made in many fields, and few or none of the evacuated personnel which formerly managed the factories have been returned. It is the same with machinery.

[166] On the other hand, where factories have been restored, the new directors have usually been sent down from Moscow to administer them, and so have the responsible workmen. The deportation from the villages still continues as the native population are removed to Siberia or elsewhere and non-Ukrainians are sent in, in accordance with a definite scheme for breaking up the homogeneity of the population.

665 Despite all this, there has scarcely passed a month in which
626 the central authorities in Moscow have not stressed defects in the working of the Ukrainian branch of the party. They have found continued failures to perform the required deliveries, a lack of ideological work and definite wrecking and deliberate sabotage due to bourgeois nationalist feelings on the part of the party leaders in the Ukraine. There has been a consistent and unrelenting attack on everything that has been done in the country, while the heads of the collective farms and the other institutions have been attacked and changed for nationalist deviations.

000 The conclusion is irresistible that it is not the intention of the central authority in Moscow to relax its pressure until it has annihilated the last point in the UkSSR which differs in the slightest degree from the rules prevailing in the RSFSR and that in the meantime it, despite its lip service to the cause of a federation, is working for a complete standardization, not only in the field of economics but in every other field as well.

resources of Ukraine for themselves. The armies of the Central Powers came into Ukraine. 728

Under the pressure of the Ukrainian armed forces and the armies of the Central Powers the Soviet 'Red Guards' had to leave Ukrainian territory. The discontent of the masses of the Ukrainian people against the pillage and terror of the Soviet troops was so great that everywhere in Ukraine uprisings against the Russian occupation broke out. This moral and political failure of the Russian Soviet régime was a heavy blow to the Communist movement in Ukraine. For this reason in May 1918, even the 'Government of Soviet Ukraine' was abolished. But for propaganda purposes it was decided to create a 'Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine', formally independent from the Russian party. This party held its congress in July 1918, in Moscow. The congress passed the resolution: 669 665

"To fight for the revolutionary union of Ukraine and Russia on the principles of proletarian centralism within the boundaries of the Soviet Russian Republic". Thus the 'Communists of Ukraine' were resolutely against Ukrainian national independence.

9. The Coup d'Etat in Ukraine and the Rule of Skoropadsky (29. 4. 1918 — 14. 11. 1918)

Declaring Ukraine an independent democratic republic by the Act of January 22, 1918, the Ukrainian Central Council passed simultaneously a wide programme of economic reforms in agriculture and industry. By this the Ukrainian Parliament wished to take away the basis for the demagogical propaganda of the Communists against the 'Ukrainian Bourgeois Government'. The Ukrainian Central Council approved in its 'Fourth Universal' a plan of a broad land reform to the benefit of the landless and poor peasantry of Ukraine. It was decided to distribute the big latifundia. 185 423

This Bill of the Ukrainian Central Council created great discontent among the big landowners in Ukraine who belonged almost exclusively to the Russian and Polish nationalities. The representatives of this group applied directly to the German authorities in Ukraine to abolish the Ukrainian Central Council. [563] 727 565

In German military circles this wish was met favourably, for they thought that the big landowners would be able to supply grain for the armies of the Central Powers better than the small peasant husbandry. In German politics the decision lay with persons whose attitude was hostile to Ukrainian state independence, General Ludendorff and others. They thought it might be useful for Germany to afford no possibility for the development of the Ukrainian

731 Gouvernement had its own 700,000 sufferers, that is, about one half
652 of the population".

"The measure of misfortune here surpasses all that can be seen throughout the famine-stricken Volga areas", the author of the report on the famine in Ukraine remarks.

The horrible famine in Ukraine aggravated by the special 'hunger policy' of Soviet Russia helped the Russian Communists to destroy the partisan movement in Ukraine and to strengthen their rule.

3. Ukraine in the Time of the 'New Economic Policy' (NEP)

185 In 1921 Lenin proclaimed the 'New Economic Policy' in the
656 Soviet state. From 1922 peasants and small private contractors
[423] were given some facilities. Small landownership was secured for 9 years for the peasants. Instead of requisitions a tax was introduced. Free trade was re-established. In order to appease the masses of the peasants of the peoples oppressed by Moscow, the Communist dictatorship made some concessions for the development of the
[191] national cultures. In Ukraine the Ukrainian language was given rights in schools, administration, in the press and judicature. This was the so-called policy of 'Ukrainisation'.

[631] The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics was proclaimed at the end of 1922 at the Soviet Congress in Moscow. The Communist organisation in Ukraine, consisting of foreign imported elements, particularly insisted upon the strengthening of centralisation with regard to the separatist tendencies of the Ukrainian movement (*Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Ukraine* from October 17, 1922).

186 But there were also voices among the Communists speaking
668 against Russian centralism. Thus, for instance, at the 12th Congress of the Russian CP in Moscow (April 1923) the Ukrainian problem extensively was discussed. The President of the Soviet Government in Ukraine, Rakovsky himself, had, after the experience with Ukrainian resistance, changed his former opinion on the Ukrainian national rebirth as a 'hopeless matter', his own expression in 1919. Now Rakovsky attacked those Communists who did not understand the importance of the Ukrainian problem and followed in Ukraine a policy of Russification. Rakovsky declared at this Co[illegible]ress that the Ukrainian problem belonged to those problems that "promise us a civil war ... I am beginning to fear for the further fate of the Soviet Government ... In Ukraine we succeed only with difficulties in forcing our organisations, carrying on their work in the conditions of a national fight, to understand the national problem. All our national policy in international relations

186 Ukraine, demanded that the Communist Party stopped its policy of
665 Russification of the Ukrainian workers. On May 12, 1926, Shumsky declared at a session of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP of Ukraine:

"In the Party, the Russian Communists are ruling, who treat the Ukrainian Communists with distrust and enmity".

In a letter to the Central Committee of he CP of Ukraine of February 1927, Shumsky wrote: "The Ukrainian Communist feels himself indeed a stepson of the Party".

[558] For this 'deviation' the top institutions of the Communist Party resolutely condemned Shumsky. He was deprived of his office and sent to Russia.

656 A new 'deviation' was detected in the CP of Ukraine in 1928.
186 The Communist Volobuyev showed in his articles that economi-
687 cally Ukraine was a Russian colony. He demanded for Ukraine the securing of a free economic development. Volobuyev published figures which proved that Ukraine was giving Russia almost 1/3 of her incomes without equivalent. He pointed out that Russia was sending workers from Russia into Ukraine, thus artifically creating a majority of Russian elements in the Ukrainian industrial centres (*The Bolshevik of Ukraine*, No. 3: Kharkov, 1928). Volobuyev was punished alike for this 'nationalist deviation'.

186 In spite of all these difficulties and hindrances created by the
517 Russian Government for the development of Ukrainian culture, the time of 'Ukrainisation' gave some gains for cultural Ukrainian progress, even in the conditions of the Communist dictatorship: Ukrainian shools — elementary, secondary and academic — had been organised; the Ukrainian Academy of Science developed its work extensively. In a few years of cultural work the cadres of a
[538] new Ukrainian intelligentsia were created. The Ukrainian literary production developed in spite of all obstacles on the part of the Soviet régime. The protest against the oppression of Ukraine by Moscow appeared also in the Ukrainian literature: a trend arose in the Ukrainian literature with orientation towards the free civilisation of Western Europe, against Russian Communist rule (the Communist Khvylyovy). Against such 'heresy' Moscow acted with ruthless repressions.

4. Ukraine in the Time of the First Five Years Plan (1929—1934)

● 185 The policy of collectivisation and industrialisation started in 1929 with enormous demands on Ukrainian national economy. Moscow used the Ukrainian national economy predominantly for

[1, Alexander Shumsky, Commissar of Education -- Analyst]

the industrialisation of Russia. The production of the heavy industries in Ukraine gave in 1931 63% of the whole output of coal, 83% of the production of coke and 77% of iron ore of the USSR (*Izvestia:* Moscow, March 1, 1932). "The production of the Ukrainian plants solves the entire problem of metals in the whole Soviet Union" — the Kharkov *Communist* wrote on October 13, 1931. With these demands on the Ukrainian national economy Moscow placed the workers of Ukraine in the worst conditions. In the wage index the Ukrainian metal workers stood in 1931 in the 11th place, the miners in the 19th, the coke workers in the 27th place (*Izvestia:* Moscow, February 1, 1932). The conditions of work, dwelling, social insurance and cultural service of the workers in Ukraine were much worse than in Russia.

The forced collectivisation of the Ukrainian agriculture, started in 1929/30, caused horrible devastation among the Ukrainian peasants. Not less than 200,000 farms were destroyed, their property was taken into the collective farms (*Communist,* Kharkov, December 21, 1934). The owners of these farms, the so-called 'kulaks', were deported together with their families into the North of Russia, where they mostly died of hunger and disease caused by forced labour. If one counts a normal Ukrainian peasant family at least 6 persons the number of those ruined and destroyed by this collectivisation reached 1,200,000 persons. In reality the number of the victims of Stalin's 'General Line' was much greater.

This 'liquidation of the kulaks as a class' has not only taken the lives of millions of Ukrainian farmers: it has destroyed the best elements among the peasants. These peasants were no 'exploiters': they were able farmers who tilled their land in the sweat of their brows and produced grain for their families and for the market. Due to this absurd and cruel 'liquidation of the kulaks' the shortages in the supply of agricultural products grew enormously.

Simultaneously with the 'General Line' the centralisation in Ukraine to Moscow's advantage was tightened: in the administration, in both economy and cultural work. In November 1929, the Commissariat of Agriculture of Ukraine was abolished and Ukrainian agriculture was subordinated directly to Moscow. The autonomy of Ukraine in the field of education was considerably restricted; in 1931 the separate Commissariat of the Interior in Ukraine was abolished; in 1933 the Commissariat of Justice was subordinated to Moscow, etc.

According to the directives from Moscow the Ukrainian culture had to be 'national in form, Communist in content'. Therefore

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

(b) *Organizations to promote Trade and Commerce*

Organizations to promote trade in the Ukraine are not numerous. The true traders of the country are the native Jews, and to trace their involved dealings is impossible.

The sales of the coal and iron are almost wholly controlled by rings and cartels. The most powerful one, the *Prodamet*, or metal sales combine, controlled recently over 80 per cent. of all the iron and steel produced in South Russia and threatened to absorb the entire output.

The activities of the *zemstvos* in trade call for mention. These organs of local government actively enter into trade in agricultural machinery, improved seed, and pedigree live-stock, and endeavour to improve the facilities for selling the products of domestic industry. Their aim is to lift the internal commerce of the country from the condition of dependence on speculating middlemen, into which it has almost irretrievably fallen, but their achievements so far only touch the fringe of a deep-seated social trouble.

There are chambers of commerce at Odessa, Kiev, Kharkov, Berdyansk, and Mariupol, and there is a branch of the Russo-British Chamber of Commerce at Odessa. Odessa, Nikolaev, and Yelisavetgrad have corn exchanges, and coal and iron exchanges exist at Kharkov.

(c) *Foreign Interests and Methods of Economic Penetration*

The present state of commerce in the Ukraine provides a wide field for economic penetration from abroad. Agriculture in its first stages is not much affected, but in one case, that of the production of sugar from beet, the secondary stages of manufacture have been much exploited by foreign capital and management. The coal and iron mining industries and the iron and steel manufacturing industries owe their foundation in great measure to foreigners, by whom they are still largely

10: Weinstein S-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

In 1937 only 240 hours were allotted to the study of Russian in the Ukrainian elementary schools,[87] but by 1939–40 the time devoted to this language had increased to 390 hours in the urban type and 429 hours in the rural type of elementary school. The most important change, however, occurred in the middle schools, the form of general school gradually replacing the elementary schools. In the middle schools, as the table indicates, a larger proportion of hours for language study are assigned to Russian than in the elementary schools. The table also reveals that the study of Russian in the Ukrainian middle schools is given more time than the study of Ukrainian in the Russian middle schools. As for the schools of the smaller minorities, illustrated by the plan for the Jewish and Moldavian schools, Russian assumes greater importance than Ukrainian; and in the middle schools of these nationalities, the study of Ukrainian has a position far below Russian and only a little higher than that of foreign languages. The pupils of the smaller nationalities would encounter Ukrainian in their extra-school life more frequently than Russian, except in the large cities where Russian is still widely used in social intercourse; and if they were to know Ukrainian and Russian equally well, more time would have to be assigned to the latter. Likewise, the Russian pupils, except in the large cities, would be more familiar with Ukrainian than the Ukrainian pupils with Russian. Because the village children would hear Russian spoken less often than the city children the rural schools have more time allotted to Russian than do the urban schools. The study of foreign languages has become increasingly important since 1932; and only last November the Commissariat of Education decided that in some middle schools the study of French, English or German should begin in the third rather than the fifth grade, thereby raising the time devoted to foreign languages from 446 hours to 602 hours.[88]

Educational work among the older generation follows the direction of that among the children in the schools. A campaign to teach adults to read and write their mother tongues has met with substantial results, and the newly literate non-Russians are being encouraged to go on and study Russian as well as their native languages. This fostering of bi-lingualism is accompanied by an attempt on the part of the government to make the population in the Ukraine multi-cultured. Increased attention is being given to popularizing the literature and music of the Russians and of other nationalities both within and without the Soviet Union; and the Russian cinema and radio are —

[87] *Za Kommunističeskoe Prosveščenie*, May 14, 1937.
[88] *Zbirnik Nakaziv . . .*, 1940, sec. 336, pp. 8–9.

10: Weinstein S-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

in spite of efforts to produce films and to broadcast programs in the Ukrainian language — potent forces for assimilation to Russian culture. To the goal of assimilation, moreover, much is contributed by the industrialization of the Ukraine: new factories bring rural Ukrainians into the cities where Russian still predominates in social life, and the younger Ukrainians in the city easily adopt the prevailing language. But these forces for assimilation, even though coupled with the inculcation of communist doctrines through the media of education and culture, may be cancelled by a growth of nationalism; and such nationalism may thrive on the shocks of economic disorders and unsuccessful foreign war. The language policy itself promotes the process of assimilation by encouraging bi-lingualism; but by stressing the use of minority languages, it furthers at least a greater temporary diversification. The question of whether the forces of unity are now stronger or weaker than the forces of division can be answered only by the future.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

budget plans. If things went on in this way the social system of communism would face serious crises as a result of the flourishing peasant economy of the Ukraine - in the regions of Great Russia communal ownership of fields has prevailed since ancient times - and the Muscovite conception of national unity might be seriously threatened by the increasing power of "assembled peoples".

In order to avoid these dangers and also in view of other considerations, Stalin discontinued the New Economic Policy and introduced the period of the Five Year Plans. In spite of the decision of the Sixteenth Party Congress, the way to Russianization was opened, and Ukrainization discontinued; Ukrainian nationalism received a hard blow when free peasant farming was immediately liquidated. There have been untold victims of these revolutionary processes which were attended by violent upheavals from the time Stalin announced his principle of "socialism within one country".

"Socialism within one country" demanded industrialization as the presupposition for the independence of the socialistic /118/ state. This industrialization had to take place throughout the realm and according to a unified plan. Every form of particularism could only be detrimental - the Ukrainian form doubly so; for in the Ukraine are the coal and metal and the water power reserves of the Dniepr from which horsepower by the millions can be obtained. Such considerations led to the First Five Year Plan, in the course of which Ukrainian economy, heavy industry, finance and particularly agriculture were subordinated to orders from Moscow. The division of private economy was "liquidated".

The new system introduced the purging of the Pan-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in the year 1930, where members of the "League for the Liberation of the Ukraine" had entrenched themselves; they were now "unmasked". In a monster trial in

[i.e., Beginning of the Five year plans — Analyst]

423 tax collection and, finally, also corresponded
241 to the patriarchal order. It was only in the former Polish Ukraine on the right side of the river that purely private ownership was retained. The Bolshevik NEP now very cleverly fastened on to the community field system.

241 With the restoration of peace and order during the NEP years the social life of the peasant country again attained its equilibrium. The families which before that were broken up or dismembered now came together again. At the same time, great efforts were made to raise the productive capacity of the new family farms by means of technical education, and in this the young farmers were particularly eager to join. At that time, a German observer wrote: "In the activity of the youth organizations in the villages we see an expression of the deep longing to be freed at last from 'the power of darkness' and not always to stand apart while the civilized races divide up the treasures of the earth among themselves." (88)

88. Veit: Farming Economy and Agrarian Set-up of the South Ukraine, page 69.

423 This hopeful development was abruptly inter-
241 rupted by the subsequent third phase of the agra-
474 rian revolution, the transfer of the individual
185 peasant farm to communal ownership of all village inhabitants. It was only by means of collectivism, the coordination of the farms with the communes in the other economic fields, that the Bolshevik regime could last; it was only in this way that one could strike at the root of Ukrainian nationalism, and only thus carry out the Five Year Plan. For industrial development with the purchase of foreign /146/ machines had to be paid for by exporting agricultural products. All that was needed now was a command, in order to maintain the export of the necessary amounts of grain at the prescribed price.

465 quality. For this the worker, if he does not spend any kopeks for food and housing, must work one and one-half months, and two months for the cheapest winter coat. Three colored shirts eat up a month's wages. For the same amount he could buy his wife three summer dresses of poor quality or three sets of underwear or three blouses. (129)

129. Statement of a German specialist in Kiyev.

Far too often the life of the Soviet Ukraine worker is exhausted in the struggle for his daily bread, for clothing and shelter, and yet before the war he was the best paid in Russia. Undoubtedly 345 the Bolsheviks have done a great deal of building, 466 but they neglected the building of houses in favor • 185 of the building of clubhouses and palaces for cultural purposes, veritable giant structures of cement and steel where in the evening the locksmiths and metal founders then assemble "in order to hear lectures on Shakespeare". "For in human history there is an urge that has never before been recognized in the great masses...for art and literature. The famous tractor brigade of the Pasha Angelin comes forth with songs, and the workers of the Khar'kov tractor factory organize their own opera. Hundreds of groups of worker and kolhosp newspapers flaunt poems, stories and essays written by forge and tractor workers."

He whose thoughts take flight on the wings of Pegasus will find his hands only mechanically at 433 work. Among the construction workers the "never-before recognized urge of the great masses...for art and literature" expresses itself in the following way, according to Pravda of July 16, 1937: "The brick production program for the year could only be 19 percent accomplished in the first five months of the year, and the two subsequent months have also brought no change. The construct-

462 ran her train 900 kilometers without changing engines. The train personnel consisted entirely of women." This according to Izvestiia of November 21, 1938. Pravda /182/ of May 4th, 1939 has a report of the modern types of feminine desires of the Ukrainian women in the Donets Basin: In the Voroshilovgrad region the number of housewives who express a desire to work in the mines increases every day. Recently 190 housewives were taken on in the mines of the Krasnoluky district. In Shaft Number 151 the women mine workers challenged their husbands to a competition. Comrade Khodonovich entered into competition with her husband who works as a locksmith in the same pit. Twelve of the housewives employed, systematically produced 130 to 150 percent of the norm." Under the pseudonym "sundries" behind which a Jew may be hiding, an enthusiastic admirer of this womanly existence writes: "Women, their work-blouses stretched tight over their breasts, their checked cap with a visor pulled over their short hair, with hard eyes that know no maidenly dreams, drive the motor trucks madly from one hall to another through long avenues that seem to meet in perspective. Women with hands that do not know how to hold children grasp red-hot rods with iron tongs and let them send forth sparks under pneumatic hammers. Is it a man or woman, this human form in leather here at the clattering mold, there in the hellish concert of the grindery?"(132)

132. Sundries: Russia Close Up, page 140.

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• 185 At the beginning of the third Five Year Plan, the Moscow Review of June 10th, 1937 wrote among other things: "The rapid development of mass well-being and culture will in general be one of the distinguishing features of the third Five Year Plan. At this point every possibility of comparison with America ceases. For that sort of thing

185 exists only in socialism." At the Party Congress in 1939, Stalin corrected these and similar expressions of conceit. He turned against the "fancifulness" of the advance estimates of the last Five Year Plan. The hopes of the proletarian masses of the Union for the promised paradise, nourished for more than twenty years, /183/ were abruptly destroyed by the "father of the people" with his allusion to the sacrifices which are still necessary in order to catch up with the most progressive states. There was still time for that, Stalin said, "and not a little time".

/184/ Emigrants

668 Although the Ukrainian people do not have a state (the Soviet Ukraine is merely a province of Moscow), they have three governments which have their seat in some foreign European country. There is the government of hetman Skoropadskiy which resigned in 1918 and was later revived in exile; then the directorate of the Ukrainian People's Republic which originally consisted of five presidents. Its chairman Petliura is dead and its members have scattered. Finally there is a West Ukrainian government. The political emigration [162] from the Soviet Union, Bessarabia, Bukovina and Poland resides almost altogether in Europe. Here it numbers 150,000 souls including the emigrants. Of these about 50,000 East Ukrainians alone are living in what was formerly Poland, 50,000 Ukrainians are living in France, 15,000 without protectorate and 5000 under aprotectorate in Germany, 8000 in Belgium and 5000 each in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The rest are divided up among twelve countries.

The world knows little about the former governments, nor do they stand out. All of them cling tenaciously to the fiction of their legality. The most active among them is the Petliura govern-

[Ukrainian Constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

423 474 Art. 8. The land occupied by collective farms is secured to them free of charge and for an unlimited time, that is, in perpetuity.

472 Art. 9. Alongside the socialist system of economy in the Ukrainian SSR the law permits the private economy of individual peasants and artisans based on their own work and precluding the exploitation of the labour of others.

421 Art. 10. The right of citizens to personal ownership of their incomes from work and of their savings, of their dwelling houses and subsidiary household economy, their household furniture and utensils, articles of personal use and convenience, as well as the right of inheritance of personal property of citizens, is protected by law.

185 471 Art. 11. The economic life of the Ukrainian SSR is determined and directed by the State National Economic Plan with the aim of increasing the public wealth, of steadily improving the material and cultural level of the working people and of consolidating the independence of the socialist country and strengthening its defensive capacity.

461 Art. 12. In the Ukrainian SSR work is a duty and a matter of honour for every able-bodied citizen, in accordance with the principle: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat."

The principle applied in the Ukrainian SSR is that of socialism: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work."

Chapter II. The State Structure

642 Art. 13. For the purpose of mutual assistance among the Union Republics along economic and political lines, as well as along the line of defence, the Ukrainian SSR voluntarily united with the other equal Soviet Socialist Republics, namely:

The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic,
The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic and
The Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic

in a federal state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Proceeding from the aforesaid, the Ukrainian SSR ensures to the USSR, as represented by its higher organs of state power and organs of state administration, the rights defined in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR.

Outside of the spheres set forth in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR exercises state authority independently, retaining its sovereign rights in full.

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439 been food supplies, which in many Ukrainian towns constituted the only
648 food to be seen in shops in 1946. For fats and oils particularly the Ukrainian population has been entirely dependent on UNRRA aid.

The U.S.S.R.'s Five-Year Plan, 1946-50

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648 UNRA assistance to the Ukraine has been of necessity limited in scope and short-term in nature. Long after relief shipments are ended - and they are now all but complete - the Ukraine will still be working to rebuild its factories, cities, and farms. The main task of rehabilitation is therefore a long-term one, and depends upon long-range measures.

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185 On March 18, 1946, the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. adopted a Five-Year Plan, 1946-50, for the rehabilitation and development of the national economy of the Soviet Union. This plan is the fourth of a series of Five-Year Plans[1] designed to increase the productivity of Soviet farming and industry, and in general to raise the standard of living of the whole population. As stated by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., the principal aims of the Five-Year Plan in 1946-50 are to rehabilitate the devastated regions of the country, to recover the pre-war level in industry and agriculture, and then considerably to surpass that level.

[652] The new Five-Year Plan provides that nearly one-third of the capital investments for the entire Soviet Union in 1946-50 (49,500 million roubles out of a total of 250,300)[2] are to be spent on the restoration of the Ukraine. Of this 49,500 million, 5,469 million will be used for works under the Ukrainian Republic's jurisdiction.

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727 In the next five years all the destroyed cities of the Ukraine -
362 particularly Kiev, Kharkov, Chernigov, Odessa, Dniepropetrovsk, Stalino, and Zaporozhie - are to be rebuilt and their municipal services restored. Housing is to be replaced as speedily as possible; in 1946-50, 175,120,000 square feet of state-owned housing are to be built, of which 12.65 million square feet are to be made available by local Soviets. The amount of privately owned housing to be built before 1950 is fixed at 36.3 million square feet.

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185 Also under the Five-Year Plan Ukrainian agriculture is to be rehabilitated; the crop area for 1950 is planned at 30.5 million hectares. By 1950 the Ukraine is scheduled to be producing about 20 per cent. of the grain harvested in the U.S.S.R. (approximately the same tonnage as in pre-war years); 60 per cent. of the sugar beet (about 6 per cent. more than pre-war); and the potato harvest is fixed for 23 million tons, 1½ millions more than in 1940.

000 Industry is to be revived; railroads and other forms of transport

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1 First Five-Year Plan, 1929-32; second, 1933-37; third, 1938-42.

2 Estimated at 1945 prices.

727 Industry is to be revived; railroads and other forms of
433 transport are to be rebuilt; the mining of coal is to regain and then to outstrip the pre-war output; the production of machinery and equipment for both light and heavy industry is to be restored; and to do this, iron and steel production is to be increased until it surpasses pre-war. War damaged power stations are to be rehabilitated, and additional ones are to be constructed, particularly in smaller communities.

[185] Altogether the output of industrial enterprises in the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is envisaged at 9,200 million roubles, of which the output of state industries under local jurisdiction and of industrial co-operatives is estimated to comprise 3,100 million roubles[1].

The volume of industrial production in the whole U.S.S.R. in 1950 - that is, the last year of the Five-Year Plan - is fixed at 205,000 million roubles (in 1926-27 prices). Compared with 138,500 million roubles in 1940, this represents an increase in industrial output of 48 per cent.

727 Particular stress in the Five-Year Plan is laid on the development
433 of the Western Ukraine and the Transcarpathian Region. Lvov, the main
361 city of the Western Ukraine, is to be developed into a major industrial centre, where there are to be built and put into operation an automobile assembly plant, electrical, telephone, and telegraph-equipment manufacturing plants, a glass works, a knitting mill, and food processing plants.

In the Transcarpathian Region, new light industry plants are to be constructed, and the mining of brown coal (lignite) is to be organized and extended. Provision is to be made for the rehabilitation and development of the woodworking and wood chemical industries and of farming, particularly fruit-growing, viticulture, livestock breeding and apiculture,
[652] as well as of the food processing industries. The farms of the Transcarpathian Region are to be given considerable state assistance in the form of agricultural machines, fertilizers, and credits.

000 A more detailed discussion of the Five-Year Plan in connection with farming and the various industries follows in later sections of this report.

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[475] It must be remembered that a number of enterprises although situated in the Ukrainian Republic are not under the Republic's jurisdiction, but under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Union Government.

The Five-Year Plan in Ukrainian Agriculture

185 311 474 According to the Five-Year Plan 1946-50 the crop area of the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is to reach 30.5 million hectares, of which 21.3 million are to be planted on the collective farms. The distribution of major crops is planned as follows.

TABLE XIII

Ukraine: Crop Area in 1950 (Planned)
(hectares)

	Total area	Including on the collective farms
Grain crops	19,600,000	14,100,000
Industrial crops	2,600,000	2,200,000
Melons, potatoes, and other vegetables	2,800,000	1,000,000
Fodder crops	5,400,000	4,000,000

Source: The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50

The area sown to sugar beet in 1950 is fixed at 830,000 hectares, and to sunflower, 801,000 hectares. The hopfields are to be rehabilitated, and the area of vineyards growing European varieties of grapes is to be expanded. Measures are to be taken to drain 40,000 hectares and irrigate 30,000 hectares of farm land; and all engineering work needed to ensure normal production is to be restored.

241 433 185 Average yields of Ukrainian crops in 1950 are envisaged as follows: grain, 1.42 tons per hectare (compare 1939 average 1.36); flax, 0.42 tons; sugar beet, 19 tons; and potatoes, 11.2 tons per hectare.[1]

In the entire Soviet Union in 1950 the grain harvest is planned at 127 million tons, of which the Ukraine is to produce 27.8 million tons, or more than one-fifth. The Ukraine's sugar beet harvest is fixed at 15.7 million tons, representing over 60 per cent. of the sugar beet harvest of the U.S.S.R. in 1950. The production of potatoes is expected to be 23 million tons.

The following table compares these targets with pre-war production.

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1 Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, August 28, 1946.

TABLE XIV

185 433 241 Ukraine: Planned Production in 1950 Compared with 1940 and 1913 (see Note)

(million metric tons)

	1913	1940	1950
Grain	20	28	27.8
Sugar beet	8.9	14.8	15.7
Potatoes	about 5[1]	21.5	23

1 According to the report in Pravda, the potato harvest in 1940 was "over 4 times" that of 1913.

Source: Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, August 28, 1946.

[728] Note: In comparing the 1950 target figures with pre-war production it is important to bear in mind the territorial revisions which occurred in the Ukraine after 1939, when she regained Western Ukraine and part of Bessarabia, lost a part of the Moldavian Autonomous Republic (which, together with the Moldavian Section of Bessarabia, then became a separate Union Republic), and added Northern Bukovina and Transcarpathian Ukraine.

[131] Thus the present area of the Ukraine exceeds its 1938 area by approximately 118,000 kilometres (11,800,000 hectares). However, 311 we do not know precisely how much of this is agricultural land. The 728 arable land in Western Ukraine before the war amounted to 4 million hectares; that of Transcarpathian Ukraine, to 239,000 hectares. In the parts of Bessarabia and Bukovina which were ceded to the Soviet Union, 3,285,800 hectares were classified as arable. If we roughly divide this between Moldavia and the Ukraine in proportion to the total ex-Rumanian area incorporated in each, about 1,300,000 hectares of agricultural land would have been added to the Ukraine in its share of Bessarabia; and the arable area of present-day Ukraine would exceed the 1937 cultivated area by about 5½ million hectares, the potential total being 30.6 million. The fact that the Five-Year Plan fixes the Ukraine's 1950 area of cultivation at 30.5 million hectares seems to support this assumption.

Livestock

231 In 1941 the number of livestock in the Ukraine was estimated at 30.4 million, including 10.5 million cattle and 4.6 million horses.[1]

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1 Statement on March 20, 1946, by Mr. Baranovsky, Ukrainian delegate to the UNRRA Fourth Council Session, published in the "UNRRA Journal", March 21, 1946.

231 In the first years after Western Ukraine was incorporated into the 474 Ukrainian S.S.R. there were built up in that region 285 cattle farms, 185 sheep farms, and 112 pig farms. By January 1, 1941, there was a total of 742 livestock farms in Western Ukraine alone.[1]

Bessarabia

231 There are no recent figures available for livestock in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina; in 1935, however, it was estimated that these two regions contained three-quarters of a million cattle, as well as 611,000 pigs, 2,355,000 sheep, and 602,000 horses (a total of 4,340,000 cattle, sheep, pigs and horses).[2] We have no figures as to how much of this livestock was included in the provinces added to the Ukraine.

Ukrainian S.S.R. Livestock: the Five-Year Plan

231 By 1950, according to the Five-Year Plan, the number of horses in 185 the Ukraine should reach 2,629,000, a target which is 60 per cent. lower than the pre-war figure. To attain even this number, a great increase of horses must yet be made. In order partially to compensate, the Five-Year Plan has fixed a great increase in the number of oxen, so that the total number of oxen and horses together in 1950 will be five per cent. higher than before the war.

The following table shows the planned number of livestock in the Ukrainian S.S.R. by 1950.

TABLE XVII

Livestock in the Ukraine, 1950 (Planned)

	Total	Included on the collective farms	Per cent. increase 1950 total over 1940 numbers
Cattle	12,230,000	4,700,000	16
Pigs	9,600,000	3,500,000	7
Sheep and goats	6,780,000	3,100,000	8
Horses	2,629,000	1,363,000	- 60[1]

1 Decrease from 1941 figure.

Source: Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, August 28, 1946.

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1 Soviet State and Law III, Moscow, 1941.

2 International Institute of Agriculture, Rome.

●/85 According to the new Five-Year Plan, the output of meat in the 253 Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 will amount to 245,000 tons (for the entire 234 Soviet Union the production target is fixed at 1,300,000 tons) while output of butter for the Ukraine in the year 1950 is fixed at 40,000 tons (275,000 tons for the entire Soviet Union).

The following factories and farms will be rehabilitated or built: 55 meat packing plants, 33 refrigerator plants, 97 poultry farms, 46 milk factories, and 100 butter and cheese factories.

727 433 the destruction that there are competing calls upon the limited supplies of manpower, equipment and materials. We observed many instances of ingenious adaptation and salvaging of old and antiquated machinery; yet restoration was everywhere slow and complicated by lack of equipment to move away the rubble, transport the materials, produce the electric energy, and repair the streets, sewers, and gas and electric lines. There is a vicious circle. Iron and steel, for example, are needed to repair electric power stations and rebuild houses; efforts to restore these basic industries and facilities are constantly delayed because there is not enough shelter; and neither shelter nor the industries and community facilities can be replaced until there are more cranes, tractors and trucks. Low-calorie diets, induced by lack of foodstuffs, cause low efficiency and slow production. The food UNRRA is shipping has sustained the people, though, to be sure, it has not been sufficient to compensate for local shortages; the country may somewhat accelerate its industrial rehabilitation - especially of shelter and water supplies - when the equipment items on the UNRRA programme arrive. Meanwhile it is slowly restoring those parts of its economy which will respond to manpower aided by a minimum amount of mechanical equipment."

Industrial Aims of the Five-Year Plan

185 729 The great importance of rehabilitating Ukrainian industry and the share which Ukrainian industry has to take in the entire Soviet Union economy are shown by the new Five-Year Plan.

By comparing the aims for 1950 with pre-war production figures, it is possible to have some impression of the destruction which occurred in the Ukraine during the war.

The table which follows shows the planned ratio of Ukrainian output in 1950 to the output of the entire Soviet Union. Where possible, pre-war figures have been included.

TABLE XVIII

Share of Ukrainian Industry in Total Soviet Production

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1940

	Ukrainian S.S.R.	U.S.S.R. total	Ukraine (per cent. of total)
	(thousand metric tons)		
Pig iron	9,200	14,900	61
Steel	8,600	18,400	47
Coal	83,800	164,600	51
Tractors (units)	n.a.	176,000[1]	n.a.
Locomotives (units)	880[2]	1,214[2]	72[2]
Sugar	1,790[2]	2,378[2]	75[2]

1950 (planned)

	Ukrainian S.S.R.	U.S.S.R. total	Ukraine (per cent. of total)
	(thousand metric tons)		
Pig iron	9,700	19,500	49.7
Steel	8,800	25,400	34.6
Coal	86,100	250,000	34.4
Tractors (units)	25,000	112,000	22.3
Locomotives (units)	1,000	2,720	40.0
Sugar	1,637	2,400	68.2
Metallurgical equipment	n.a.	n.a.	33.9

1 1938 figure
2 1937 figures

Note: n.a. means not available.

Source: Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, September 1, 1946; The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50; Russia's Economic Front for War and Peace, A. Yugov, C.A. Watts and Co., Ltd., London, 1941.

Progress in 1946

At the beginning of 1947 the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R. issued a statement describing the progress in rehabilitation and development made during 1946. According to this statement the gross output of industry in the entire U.S.S.R. increased by 20 per cent. in 1946 as compared with 1945. About 800 government enterprises had been built, restored, or launched during the year. Navigation was opened on restored canals. A series of steps were also taken in 1946 to expand Soviet trade and consolidate the currency. Wages and salaries of low and medium-paid workers were raised.

Coal: Plans for the Future

185 433 316 Under the Five-Year Plan, the coal industry of the Ukraine is to be speedily rehabilitated and further developed, so that by 1950 its output will be 86,100,000 tons, including about 6 million tons of brown coal (lignite).[1] When it is remembered that this target is only 2.3 million tons over 1940 production, the enormous task of rehabilitation confronting the industry is made clear. The difficulties are even more accentuated if one compares the increase of coal production in three pre-war years, from 1937 to 1940, when output leaped from 70 million tons to 83.8 millions.

Plans for increasing the future coal output of the Ukraine include not only the restoration of old mines but also intensive prospecting and the sinking of many new shafts.

"Between 1946-50, coal mines with an aggregate capacity of 77,500,000 tons are to be put into operation in the Stalino and Voroshilovgrad regions of the Ukrainian S.S.R.[2]"; and coal fields in other areas are to be further developed. In particular there are to be put into operation in the Donets Basin and in the western regions of the Ukraine, small coal mines and drifts with a total capacity of 4,600,000 tons of coal, and peat briquette plants with a capacity of 50,000 tons.

The lignite mining industry is to be developed and by 1950 is expected to supply annually some 6 million tons of coal. Five lignite mines operating in the Ukraine in 1946 increased their output in October by three times as compared with April.

135 654 Large coal supplies are expected from the regions west of the Dnieper, where 11 promising coal deposits are located. Prospecting is in progress there, as well as in the Zlochev, Krzemenets, and Kolomya areas of Western Ukraine, where 28 shafts had been sunk by November 1946.[3]

Industrial lignite deposits have also been found in an area of four square miles between Slavgarod and Sinolhikovo (near Dniepropetrovsk) and in the Transcarpathian region.

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1 The coal output of the entire Soviet Union in 1950 is fixed at 250 million tons.

2 The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50

3 Soviet Monitor, London, November 21, 1946.

135 To the south-east, in the Don and northern Donets valleys,
654 geologists have discovered a number of new coal-bearing areas, and have confirmed that the Donets Basin coal layers stretch far to the east and south.

Other investigations of coal-bearing areas are to begin shortly, particularly around the Azov Sea coast and in other regions bordering the Donets Basin.

Coke

316 The coke output of the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is planned to be 15,500,000 tons.

Natural Gas and Oil

315 With the incorporation of Western Ukraine in 1939, the Ukrainian
183 S.S.R. came into possession of oil producing regions. The Five-Year Plan calls for the intensive development of these and other areas of the Ukraine for the increased production of oil and natural gas.
[654] Three hundred and twenty-five wells are to be located to add to the petroleum resources of the western regions; prospecting for commercial deposits of petroleum in the Rozny area is to be completed; and there is to be extensive geological exploration for natural gas in the Dragobych Region (Western Ukraine) and on the Azov and Black Sea coasts.

[382] The total output of petroleum in the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is fixed by the Five-Year Plan at 325,000 metric tons.

The plan also provides for the building of a gas pipeline from Dashava to Kiev. Already in process of construction, the first section of the pipeline will be completed this year (1947) and will supply gas to more than 30,000 flats and several large industrial plants in Kiev.

Electric Power Stations

377 Electrification has been one of the outstanding features of the Soviet economy. Before the war the Ukrainian Republic possessed a wide network of electric power stations. Best known was the huge Dnieper Don and Lenin Hydro-electric Station, completed in 1932 near Zaporozhie. This station supplied electric power to a great industrial region: in the north the steel mills of Dniepropetrovsk and Dnieprodzerzhinsk, and to the south-east, the Nikopol manganese mines. These three industrial centres developed quickly after the Dnieper Dam was built; and the abundance of cheap power available from it also gave rise to the growth of a metal and machine-building centre at Zaporozhie.

727 In August 1941 the retreating Soviet army troops partially disabled
397 the Dnieper Dam and power station to prevent its falling into enemy hands. This destruction was later completed by the Germans. When the Soviet Army recaptured the region, they found that 35 of the dam's 48 piers had been blown up, and all the generators destroyed. Damage to the power house alone was estimated at 500,000,000 roubles.

Reconstruction work began in February 1944, when the war was still on. Three years later the assembly of the first power unit of 72,000 kilowatt capacity was completed; and on March 3, 1947, the Lenin Hydro-electric Station supplied its first post-war currency to the industry of the Dnieper Valley.

There are over 11,000 men and women engaged on the restoration job, which has involved repairing the dam and the underwater structures, building the housing for the power station, and mounting the machines. Another two power units are to be assembled later this year.

After the expulsion of the Germans from the Ukraine, the capacity of the Republic's power stations was only 0.4 per cent. of pre-war. By the end of August 1946 restored capacity had reached 47 per cent. In the Donets Basin 70 per cent. had been restored, and in the Stalino area, 79 per cent. In the city of Lvov (Western Ukraine) the pre-war capacity of its electric power stations had been surpassed by 18 per cent. In the first seven months of 1946 much had been accomplished: some 400 power stations, including 215 hydro-electric plants, had been launched in the Ukraine; and it was expected that 750 more power stations would be completed by the end of the year.

The Five-Year Plan fixes the 1950 output of electric power in the Ukraine at 13,690 million kilowatt hours. The total capcity of Ukrainian power stations is to be increased in 1946-50 by 2,57_,000 kilowatts. The Five-Year Plan directs that:-

"The Lenin Hydro-electric Station on the Dnieper shall be rebuilt. Small hydro-electric power plants with a total capacity or 203,000 kilowatts shall be built to meet the requirements of agriculture and local consumers. Plant aggregating 95,000 kilowatts shall be put into operation at municipal electric power stations."

The restoration of electric power facilities will assist greatly in rehabilitating other sections of the Soviet economy

Iron and Steel

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327 The Five-Year Plan for the Ukrainian S.S.R. envisages an output in
433 1950 of 9.7 million tons of pig iron, and 8.8 million tons of steel.

In order to accomplish this, the iron and steel plants of the Donets Basin and the Dnieper region are to be rehabilitated; and there are to be put into operation 30 blast furnaces with an aggregate annual capacity of 9 million tons of pig-iron, steel smelting units with a

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capacity of 8.4 million tons of steel, and 58 rolling mills with a capacity of 6.5 million tons of finished rolled goods.

In view of the enormous destruction of industry during the war, these aims are heroic, because they in fact mean that for five years the Ukrainian iron and steel industry will be striving to regain and then even to exceed, the production of 1940. This is shown by the following table, which gives the pre-war output of iron ore, manganese ore, pig-iron, and steel, as well as the planned output of the latter two in 1950. Figures for the U.S.S.R. as a whole are also included for comparison.

TABLE XIX

Ukraine: Production of Pig Iron and Steel
(thousand metric tons)

Year	Iron ore		Manganese ore	
	Ukrainian S.S.R.	Whole U.S.S.R.	Ukrainian S.S.R.	Whole U.S.S.R.
1928	4,671	5,700	531	1,200
1932	7,925	12,100	443	1,400
1937	16,414	26,000	957	2,000

Year	Pig iron		Steel	
	Ukrainian S.S.R.	Whole U.S.S.R.	Ukrainian S.S.R.	Whole U.S.S.R.
1928	2,361	3,300	2,409	4,300
1932	3,911	6,200	3,128	5,900
1937	8,801	14,500	8,467	17,700
1940	9,200	14,900	8,600	18,400
1950 (Planned)	9,700	19,500	8,800	25,400

Note: 1940 figures not available for iron ore and manganese ore.

Sources: Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1939; Russia's Economic Front for War and Peace, A. Yugov, C.A. Watts and Co.Ltd., and The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50.

As the table shows, areas of the Soviet Union other than the Ukraine are expected considerably to increase their production during the next several years. This, as well as the complete revival of Ukrainian plants, is particularly necessary to rebuild the transport system, and to replace tractors, machinery, and farm implements which were either stolen or destroyed during the war.

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Chemical Industry

The chemical industry of the Ukraine is based chiefly on coal deposits, but also on a number of other raw materials to be found there, including lacustrine deposits of sodium chloride (Artemovsk area) and phosphatic rocks (Konstantinovka area).

U [185]

The Five-Year Plan fixes that:

"The chemical plants of the Ukraine, including soda, nitrate, and superphosphate plants, shall be rebuilt, and the potash mines in the regions of Stanislav and Dragobych, and a new superphosphate plant, a paint and varnish plant and a plastics factory built.

U [654]

"In 1946-50 geological surveys shall be conducted with a view to locating commercial deposits of potassium salts to a total of 80 million tons, graphite to a total of 7.7 million tons, and gypsum to a total of 7 million tons."

Output in 1950 is fixed by the Plan as follows:

for the Ukrainian S.S.R.

Calcined soda	448,000 tons
Superphosphates	860,000 tons, and
Salt,	1,930,000 tons;

and for the entire Soviet Union:

Calcined soda	800,000 tons, and
Mineral fertilizers, superphosphates, nitrates and potash	5,100,000 tons.

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Light Industry[1]

By the end of 1946 the production of consumer goods in the U.S.S.R. had already revived considerably; output in the different branches ranged from 20 to 50 per cent. above 1945. Reconversion of the factories to peacetime production was largely completed; however, three big tasks remained: to complete the rehabilitation of all light industry enterprises wrecked by the Nazis; to replace the old or worn-out machinery; and to obtain an adequate supply of labour and materials.

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1 Soviet News, London, December 30, 1946, and February 6, 1947.

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313 area of this Republic, the high proportion of sawing frames reveals the advanced development of its timber industry.

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313 During the war Soviet timber enterprises, along with other industries,
727 suffered considerably. Much has been done to repair the damage, but rehabilitation work has been seriously hampered by shortages of wagon transport and of seasonal labour. In January this year a Pravda leading article announced that the preparation of timber in the U.S.S.R. was nine million cubic metres short of the plan, and that the shipment of prepared timber was "in an even worse condition," particularly in the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Republics. Part of the difficulty at least was due to breakdowns in tractors, but chiefly to labour shortage and low labour productivity. Here again, as in all branches of industry and agriculture, the exceedingly low food ration scales must be taken into account.

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●185 The Five-Year Plan includes the following provisions for
313 Ukrainian timber developments:

> "To reduce the haulage of lumber to the Ukrainian S.S.R., the general plan for the production of undressed lumber in the Ukraine in the years 1946-50 shall be set at 47,600,000 cubic metres, with provision for an increase of felling in the western regions of the Ukraine and a restriction of felling in its eastern regions. Reafforestation shall be carried on extensively, timber being planted in the period 1946-50 on an area of 252,000 hectares and measures taken to replenish the thinned forests and to introduce fast-growing varieties of timber."

Paper Production

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287 In 1937 the Ukraine produced 28,400 tons of paper, as compared with 22,600 tons in 1932. This output represented, in 1937, 3.42 per cent. and, in 1932, 4.8 per cent. of the Soviet Union total paper production.[1]

In 1946 the reviving paper industry of the Ukraine turned out about 9,500 tons of paper and cardboard, exceeding its production programme by 10 per cent. This year the output of paper and cardboard is expected to be more than double that of 1946.

The first section of a mill producing paper bags has been launched in the Dragobych Region, and another paper mill is being built in the same region. Two cardboard factories are being built, one in Lvov and one in Rakhov (Transcarpathian Region).[2]

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1 Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1939.

2 Soviet Monitor, London, January 10, 1947.

Production of Building Materials

339 In connection with the reconstruction work being carried out in
● 185 the Ukraine, the production of building materials is extremely important. The Five-Year Plan lays down that the pre-war production of bricks is to be increased by 50 per cent. of tiles, by 170 per cent. of lime, by 120 per cent., and of gypsum by 190 per cent. The Plan also states that

> "Plants for the production of building materials - including cement, glass, brick, lime, and tile works, plants producing metal fixtures, prefabricated houses, building sections, plumbing fixtures, roofing materials and high tensile gypsum - shall be restored or built and stable local fuel and power supplies created for the building material plants."

The Ukrainian output of cement in 1950 is expected to be 2,065,000 tons as compared with 10,500,000 tons for the entire U.S.S.R.

[323] Under the jurisdiction of the Republic and local authorities there are to be put into operation in the years 1946-50 glass works with a capacity of 11-33 million square feet of glass, brick kilns with a capacity of 9 million bricks, and rolling mills and other building material plants.

Transport

727 The war and the occupation brought great devastation to the
489 transport system of the Ukraine. The greater part of the railroads were partially or completely destroyed, and many hundreds of railway bridges demolished. The port of Odessa on the Black Sea was systematically destroyed - piers, warehouses, elevators, floating cranes, and power supply. The Dnieper-Bug Canal, the only water outlet towards the west, was made impassable by the Germans, who destroyed the sluices, wrecked bridges, sank boats in midstream, and choked the canal with mud.

185 The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50, provides for the complete rehabili-
489 tation of Ukrainian transport. Railway lines and junctions, and locomotive and car repair works are to be fully restored. A number of railway lines are to be electrified; and west of the Dnieper several narrow gauge lines are to be constructed for closer connection of sugar beet growing areas with sugar refineries.

185 To alleviate the difficult situation in rail transport, motor
489 roads are to be rebuilt and extended. The Moscow-Kharkov highway is
499 to be rehabilitated and improved, and additional motor roads are to be built to connect towns of the Ukrainian S.S.R. with the towns of the North Caucasus and the Crimea. By 1950 the tonnage of freight transported by road should be 16 times the pre-war volume. The number

U 185 489 494 of road passengers should increase 7½ times; and the number of buses, by 3,000.

U 185 489 503 The Five-Year Plan also provides for the expansion of river and sea traffic. Small rivers are to be extensively adapted for navigation, and will also be utilized for local hydro-electric power supplies. Shipbuilding yards are to be rebuilt, and the tonnage of river and sea traffic is to be considerably increased. The freight turnover on small rivers of the Ukraine in 1950 is fixed by the Five-Year Plan at 450,000 metric tons.

Pre-War Traffic

U 489 In 1937 the Ukrainian railways handled 313.1 million metric tons of loads, as compared with 165.7 million in 1932. The river transport carried 7.7 million tons (4.7 million in 1932), while in the same year Ukrainian seaports handled 8.6 million tons as against 6.5 million tons in 1932.

SU 497 U 497 The U.S.S.R.'s system of rail transport is perhaps the weakest link in the Soviet economy. In 1937 the railway network of the entire Soviet Union amounted to only 86,400 kilometres (83,400 kilometres in 1933). The construction of additional lines had by no means kept pace with the expansion of industry and agriculture. The Ukraine in 1937 had some 14,400 kilometres of railway lines; and traffic loads in that year amounted to some 313.1 million metric tons. The inadequacy of the system if compared with other European countries is marked. For example, in France (the area of which was approximately equal to that of pre-war Ukraine) the length of the principal lines open for traffic on January 1, 1938, was 42,000 kilometres.

U 727 497 The war has greatly disrupted Ukrainian rail transport. Locomotives, rolling stock and tracks were heavily damaged or destroyed. The problem of rehabilitation is especially serious, because the lack of adequate transport facilities hinders other rebuilding projects. The locomotives and cars taken as reparations from Germany, being chiefly of narrow gauge, are consequently of no use on most existing Soviet tracks.

Production of Long Distance Locomotives

U 397 Before the war the output of long distance locomotives in the Ukraine was as follows.

652 657 under their jurisdiction. For example, capital works, repairs, and equipment for livestock raising centres, piggeries, cattle sheds, slaughterhouses and refrigerators (under the Ministry of Cattle Breeding); vineyards, orchards, repairs of irrigation facilities (under the Ministry of Technical Agricultural Production); repairs to barns and agricultural implements (under the Ministry of Agriculture); and rehabilitation of the brick and ceramic industry (under the Ministry of Home Construction).

Health Services. These expenditures are administered by the Ministry of Health, and include the feeding of patients, and repairs and equipment for hospitals and health service agencies.

[658] Children's Institutions (over four years) and Schools. These expenditures are handled by the Ministry of Education, and include the feeding of children; and capital works, repairs and equipment for schools and children's homes.

Social Welfare Services Directed towards the Betterment of General Well-being. These expenditures are administed by the Ministry of Social Welfare and include such services as repairs and maintenance of social welfare agencies, and assistance to invalids.

Local Rehabilitation

648 727 185 731 As at March 1, 1947, about 41 per cent. of the gross proceeds of UNRRA sales had been transferred to regional executive committees of the government for use in the local and district economy. The local projects - which are undertaken after approval by the state authorities and are subject to regular reporting and inspection - are similar in character to those carried out by the Republican Government Ministries. However, there is a considerable shift in emphasis. For example, at the regional level, nearly 57 per cent. of the total proceeds at their disposal was utilized for health services (hospitals, nurseries), 35 per cent. for children's institutions, 5 per cent. for repairs of public and industrial institutions, and 2 per cent. for the building of schools and repair of clubs.

Deliveries of UNRRA Supplies

648 731 In the original agreement between UNRRA and the Ukrainian Government was a provision that the Administration would "strive within the limits of its resources" to procure and deliver the Ukraine's share of relief and rehabilitation supplies before July 1, 1946. In the early months of 1946, however, it became clear that procurement difficulties and transport hold-ups would prevent a great part of the supplies from being delivered in time. The UNRRA-Ukrainian Agreement was therefore extended to the end of 1946.

From December 1945 (when UNRRA deliveries to the Ukraine began) up to June 30, 1946, (the time at which they were originally scheduled

361 is a wide boulevard bordered with beautiful flowers. Across the river,
341 to the left from a bridge, is a colourful little church in Russian style—a miniature replica of a Moscow *cerkev*—a piece of the Orient in a western setting. It is a delightful building coloured in dull red and white, and has a burnished cupola at the top which reflects the sun in a dazzling blaze. The interesting ikons in the interior match the fairy-tale beauty of its exterior. What a lively contrast to the dignified, twin-spired Greek Catholic cathedral and the surrounding ecclesiastical buildings on the opposite side of the river.

162 There are at least four religions in Užhorod, as well as in other
563 Ruthenian towns, and five languages are spoken there—Ruthenian, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian and Yiddish.

135 While Ruthenia has no mineral wealth comparable to that of
317 Slovakia, it supplies the entire Republic with salt. In the eastern tip of the country, right on the Rumanian frontier, there are huge deposits of mineral salt in the neighbourhood of Slatinské Doly. Although only two mines are now being worked, the annual output amounts to about 120,000 tons of salt. The huge vaulted caves of these mines afford an imposing view from a gallery which rises at a considerable height above the bottom where the miners quarry large blocks of rock-salt, cut them into small blocks, and have them hoisted through the shaft to the surface. The mineral salt which is crushed in a salt-mill is only slightly impure and requires little cleaning.

317 Salt represents the mineral wealth of Carpathian Ruthenia. But it
263 is a commodity which the poor Ruthenian peasants and wood-cutters cannot afford. In order to spice their simple and meagre food the countryfolk journey a day or two to a pool of salt-water to fill a barrel with the liquid salt.

178 To appreciate the degree of progress Carpathian Ruthenia made
511 during the twenty years of its association with Czechoslovakia, one has
185 to bear in mind the condition of this forgotten country when it first appeared on the map as a political unit. The dire poverty, the low standard of education among the majority of the population, lack of cultural amenities, infectious diseases due to abominable sanitary conditions, inadequate communications, economic and political exploitation — all these factors made the life of the Ruthenians under the Carpathian mountains rather desolate.

President Masaryk once said that thirty years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development would be needed to make the Czechoslovak State secure and happy. Carpathian Ruthenia certainly needed thirty, if not more, years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development to emerge from her condition of poverty and primitiveness.

744 One of the worst evils was the appalling sanitary conditions in
164 Ruthenia. The rate of infant mortality was among the highest in

744 Europe; and many people used to die every year from tuberculosis and
164 other chest complaints. Severe epidemics—typhoid and dysentry—used
146 to ravage the country every year; inadequate regulation of rivers and stagnant waters gave rise to malaria; undernourishment of large sections of the population was responsible for sporadic pellagra. Venereal diseases were a curse owing to lack of medical attention and of appropriate legislation.

744 This enormous task was tackled with commendable vigour by the authorities of the Republic. In a country which used to have very few
185 doctors, a proper medical service was soon organised; up-to-date hospitals and children's homes were built; Red Cross stations and other hygiene and welfare institutions, set up in many parts of Ruthenia, strove to prevent and combat disease. This systematic effort resulted in a substantial reduction of mortality, while the draining of marshlands and the regulation of streams and ponds considerably checked epidemics.

185 Realising that ignorance is the root of many social evils, the State regarded the raising of the standard of education in Ruthenia as one
871 of its foremost tasks. The achievements in this field were perhaps the most striking. A country, which in 1918 had not more than eighteen elementary schools where children were only partly taught in Ruthenian, possessed 520 Ruthenian schools two years later; and after fifteen years of independence this small country in the Carpathians could boast 1,079 schools of various kinds—elementary, upper, secondary, technical and special schools. The magnitude of this achievement becomes evident when it is borne in mind that it was necessary to educate the requisite number of Ruthenian teachers from among the rising generation.

871 Thanks to these efforts illiteracy among the younger people has become rare. Those Ruthenians who according to the last census of
212 1930 were still unable to read and write were largely middle-aged or
185 old people. But even among them illiteracy has been considerably reduced because evening schools for adults were opened wherever pos-
517 sible. The people of Ruthenia proved to be keen pupils. Within a few years the neglected country had a promising intelligentsia—administrative workers, teachers, journalists, writers, doctors, engineers, composers, artists and scientists. In the thirties more than eighty periodicals, among them ten dailies, appeared in Ruthenia, and the production of books grew from year to year. The innate aptitude for arts and crafts was given a chance of development when a special art school was established in Užhorod, and musical talent, too, received much encouragement. As many as 7.7 per cent of all musical compositions and songs broadcast by Czechoslovak radio stations were the work of Ruthenian musicians.

000 Economic development was essential to a country where bread used

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians Ruthenians

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— CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Economic development was essential to a country where bread used to be a delicacy and meat or salt a luxury. The Land Reform introduced in the whole of the Republic in 1919 was a right step in this direction, although the standard of living among the peasant population in the mountainous districts still left something to be desired even during the last years of the Republic. Industrial development, too, was promoted, and 459 factories (timber, food, stone, earthenware, glass, chemicals, electricity, metal, paper) sprang up on Ruthenian territory during the twenty years of freedom. An important factor in the industrial development was the electrification of the country which before 1918 had hardly any electricity. Better road and rail communications, too, assisted in Ruthenia's gradual progress.

The work done in Carpathian Ruthenia under the Republic was a promising beginning. The regrettable setback due to the re-occupation of the country is likely to remain a mere episode. For the resistance of the population and the struggle of the partisans indicate that the Ruthenians are aware of their mission as a free people and that they wish to continue on the path of progress on which they embarked when they decided to become a member of the Czechoslovak Republic.